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1. Introduction 
The decision to buy a book represents an activity in which social influences play a 
capital role. The choice of a title from the shelves of a bookshop is often the outcome of 
a decision process where personal attitudes are combined with a bundle of information 
from acquaintances' experiences through word-of-mouth on the one hand, and public 
sources like reviews on newspapers or magazines on the other one. Social interaction 
and information transmission, therefore, are likely powerful forces shaping the 
economics of the book publishing industry. Surveys conducted on a regular basis 
among consumers seem to support this assumption. In Italy (see e.g. AIE, 2005), for 
instance, 55% of the people that buy books affirm to possess all the information they 
need about the title they want to buy before entering a bookshop. For frequent readers 
(i.e., more than 12 books read per year), such a share rises to 69%. More than 50% of 
Italian readers state their book selection process is a by-product of word-of-mouth 
effects, while 16% and 12% of them are mostly influenced by booksellers and book 
reviews, respectively. 
As in all creative industries characterized by strong social influences and sequential 
discovery of quality (Caves, 2000) - like the movie industry or performing arts - the 
demand for new books can never be known a priori (the famous nobody knows 
principle), but it evolves dynamically over time according to decentralized information 
processes. The New York Times’ columnist Martin Arnold has admirably summarized 
this feature of the publishing business, by noting that “[…] those who say there are no 
absolutes in the gamble that is book publishing are almost right. Actually, there is one. 
Ultimately the success of a novel depends on that mystical force called word of mouth” (quoted 
in Beck, 2007). In turn, the supply has to adjust accordingly to meet a continuously 
evolving demand. The evolution of the system gives rise to a market characterized by 
complex dynamics, in which a new-entry bestseller selling 100,000 copies in a month 
cohabits with a poetry title selling a few copies per year, and all of them are sold at 
roughly the same final price. 
In addition to the social dimension affecting its consumption, a book is a typical 
experience good, the value of which can be fully recognized only after it is consumed. 
Furthermore, the cost structure of a creative process leading to a published result 
exhibits initial high fixed costs, while the marginal cost of production, that is the cost of 
producing copies from the original and of distributing them, is generally very low. 
Unlike other cultural goods (i.e., radio broadcasting or historic monuments), 
however, books are rival and excludable, so that the probability to observe market 
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failures should be ruled out almost by definition. As a result, from an industrial 
organization perspective the book publishing industry is customarily seen as a 
monopolistic competitive market which works properly, through a traditional supply 
chain composed of production, wholesale, distribution and retail (Allen and Curwen, 
1991). Far from suggesting that problems of signal extraction on the unknown quality 
of a title could add to the complexity of the book business, the consensus view 
explicitly maintains that “[…] author reputation, book reviews, book clubs and word-of-
mouth create a fair amount of transparency. […] The characteristics of book markets are not 
that different from many other markets” (Canoy et al., 2006).  
Moving from these premises, in this paper we aim at shedding some light on the 
role played by peer-to-peer influences among heterogeneous buyers on book sales, by 
empirically exploring some of the leading features of the demand for books in Italy. 
Instead of recurring to structural econometric estimates from a reduced form equation, 
we prefer to focus directly on the distributional characteristics of the data. The key 
argument of the research methodology we employ is that alternative assumptions on 
the decision-making process adopted by prospective buyers should lead to distinct 
invariant (i.e., long run) distributions of sales among all the titles available on the 
market. Conversely, the emergence of certain regularities on the way the data are 
distributed should allow us to discriminate among alternative models of consumption 
behavior, or on the plausibility of their underlying assumptions.     
Summing up our main results, we find that the Power Law (or Pareto) distribution 
with infinite variance represents a reasonable statistical model for fitting the right tail 
of the book sales’ distribution for each of three broad categories in which the book 
publishing industry can be classified, i.e. Italian novels, foreign novels and essays. 
Such a result, which may be naturally interpreted in terms of the invariant 
distributional outcome of an information contagion model, suggests that books are 
extremely risky products and that word-of-mouth is likely to add to this uncertainty, 
rather than to help reducing it. Furthermore, we find that the scaling exponents 
characterizing the sales distributions evolve in time in a cyclical fashion, signaling the 
possibility of interesting interactions between the openings of new books, the 
transmission of peer-to-peer information and seasonal effects.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the book 
publishing industry, with a special focus to Italy. Section 3 introduces some theoretical 
and empirical issues regarding the book demand distribution, and discusses a simple 
choice-theoretic model aimed at capturing its main empirical characteristics. Section 4 
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reports our empirical results, obtained exploiting a bi-monthly data-set for books sold 
in Italy over the period 1994-96. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The book publishing industry in Italy 
While in the economic literature a description of the key features of the books market 
have been offered for several countries, see e.g. U.S. (Szenberg M. and E. Youngkoo 
Lee, 1994; Greco, 2000), Denmark (Hjorth-Andersen (2000) and U.K. (Allen and 
Curwen, 1991), far less attention has been devoted so far to Italy. Since our empirical 
analysis is based on Italian data, it seems worthwhile to motivate our analysis and to 
briefly summarize the economics of the book publishing industry by reporting some 
descriptive statistics for Italy. Further details on the size and characteristics of the 
market for books in Italy can be found e.g. in AIE (2005). 
In spite of being extremely popular and its core business being well established, the 
book publishing industry across industrialized countries, and therefore in Italy as well, 
is not very large in absolute terms. In 2003, the value of total shipments (books, CD-
Rom, collection editions and exports) by Italian producers was around €3.5 billions. In 
that same year, about 4,000 editors issued 55,000 titles, of which around 70% were new 
editions. The total number of printed copies was 254 millions, to which we must add 
circa 77 millions copies (referring to 1659 titles) sold attached to newspapers or 
magazines.  
The number of people (adults aged 14-year and older) who declared to have bought 
at least one book during the previous year was 17.6 millions, while the number of 
people (with more than 6 years) who declared to have read at least one book (in 
addition to school-books) was 23 million (41.4% of the Italian population), of whom 
60% were women. The number of frequent readers (at least one book per month) is 
much lower, however, being equal to 2.8 millions. The reading-ratio for metropolitan 
areas is 47%, while it decreases to 40% for cities with less than 50,000 inhabitants, 
suggesting that people living in more concentrated place have a higher probability to 
be a reader. On average, individuals spend € 44 in books per year (including school 
and university textbooks). However, given that a mere 13% of Italian households count 
for 51% of books sold, central tendencies could be misleading.    
Most publishers segment their market by making books available in hardcover and 
paperback versions at different prices. In terms of titles, 23% of the volumes available 
at bookstores and other shops (like supermarkets) in 2003 were priced less than €7.75, 
while an additional 17% cost less than €15.50. In terms of printed copies, 67% of the 
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total has an end-sales price lower than €15.50. The average pondered price charged for 
new books was €18.52. 
The publishing industry is notoriously highly concentrated, in terms of the market 
shares of both publishing firms and titles. Just 220 publishers issued more than 50 titles 
in 2003; four large publishing groups (Mondadori, Rizzoli, De Agostini, Messaggerie 
Italiane), plus 50 middle size publishers covered around 90% of the whole market if 
measured by total book sales. As far as the market shares of titles is concerned, it 
suffices to note that in 2003 the average edition for books has been equal to 4,800 
copies, slightly lower than the mean value registered in the 1990s (6,000). During the 
same period, however, The DaVinci Code by Dan Brown and Harry Potter and Order of 
the Phoenix by Joan Rowlings sell more than 500,000 copies each. Just to fix ideas, if we 
assume that the first 10 bestsellers sell 100,000 copies each at the average pondered 
price (€18.52), it turns out that the C10 concentration index for products is equal to a 
staggering 65% of the total market for books. This back-of-the-envelope calculation 
returns figures in line with the international experience. Data reported for the U.S. 
market in Becker (1991), for instance, reveal that for a representative publisher the 
coefficient of variation in total sales from its two-year old catalogue exceeds 129% for 
hardcover fiction and 177% for nonfiction books, respectively.   
The book publishing industry, therefore, is dominated by extreme events and the 
nobody knows principle, a fate shared with other industries for which social influences 
on individual demands matter a lot and the ex-ante uncertainty on the success or failure 
of new products is so high that it cannot be reliably estimated, as the movie or the 
pharmaceuticals industries. New titles are inherently risky products: what makes a 
book successful is in general the number of readers of the first two or three months, 
which in turn depends on the composite interaction of advertising and fortuitous 
events triggering chain reactions which leads to selling stars or to flops, generally 
following hump-shaped sales patterns (Beck, 2007). Bandwagon effects and/or 
informational cascades origin from a complex stochastic process that can go anywhere, 
implying a time-increasing variance of the process. For consumers, the importance of 
previous information about the quality of a book is even more important than, say, 
knowledge about the opinions of earlier movie-goers, as books are not only expensive 
but also and above all time consuming. Moreover, differently from movies (if we 
exclude VHSs and DVDs) books are durable goods. 
These facts are at the heart of several contractual arrangements aimed at minimizing 
risk. New authors are usually asked by a publisher to sign a contract which includes a 
“first refusal” clause that guarantees to the latter the right to decide whether to edit the 
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manuscript or not, by submitting it to a refereeing process. After the author has 
published successfully his first manuscript, in turn, she is generally offered a long-term 
exclusive contract, implying that the author commits herself with the same editor for 
the manuscripts to follow under the implicit assumption that reputation effects 
contribute to sales. As the demand cannot effectively be forecasted for any particular 
piece of craftwork, however, royalties are established on the basis of a fixed-end price. 
Fixed-end pricing allows also for cross-subsidization of a large number of less 
successful projects by few, but unknown ex-ante, more successful ones due to positive 
bandwagon effects. In addition, van der Ploeg (2004) suggests that fix-price agreements 
cause more variety in titles published even in the absence of cross-subsidization, 
although at the cost of lower sales of each title due to monopolistic pricing. These 
contractual practices underline the “winner-take-all” nature of the book industry: many 
titles cause losses for publishers, but few of them allow substantial gains able to 
compensate the relevant losses produced by unsuccessful editions.  
In summary, revenues in the publishing industry are dominated by few bestsellers 
in the thick upper tail of the sales distribution, and the profits of the sector come only 
from these few industry productions. This is the reason why any publishers’ attempt at 
reducing the fundamental uncertainty surrounding the sector (by hiring highly 
reputed writers, publishing sequels, investing in adverting, and so on) is likely to fail. 
Information cascades drive the consumers’ selection process implying a variance much 
higher (potentially infinite) than the one we would expect if the business were 
Gaussian, with almost unpredictable word-of-mouth selection processes and an 
expected value of sales without any attraction power.  
A crucial issue, therefore, appears to be that of empirically modelling the dynamics 
of demand, in order to assess whether some useful regularities may be detected which 
may help in modelling the forces at work in this market. 
 
3. Empirical and theoretical issues  
The property of non-predictability of final demand for cultural goods implies that ex-
ante knowledge of buyers’ preferences and the intrinsic merit of artistic works may not 
suffice to predict the final market configuration. The complex interaction of sequential 
discovery of quality through word-of-mouth, reputation effects, advertising and 
publishers’ distributional strategies entail that the selection among many alternative 
outcomes and the speed of convergence toward them are driven by the accumulation 
of many random historical events. Among them, the spreading of information on 
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quality by early buyers is predominant. Therefore, social interactions must be taken 
into account if we aim at properly understanding the book publishing industry.  
 
3.1 Distributional analysis 
The empirical detection of social interactions in markets is well-known to be affected 
by several identification issues emerging from the so-called reflection problem (Manski, 
1993). In a nutshell, whenever the propensity of an agent to behave in some way varies 
positively with the mean behavior in a reference group, observations of market 
outcomes do not allow the researcher to assess whether individual behaviors conform 
to the mean behavior, or group behavior simply reflects the aggregate behavior of 
isolated individuals. While several identification procedures have been successfully 
proposed (Brock and Durlauf, 2000; Manski, 1997), all of them relies on the availability 
of micro data or spatially organized observations for the same phenomenon (Glaeser 
and Scheinkman, 2001). Alas, given the data at our disposal none of these strategies are 
available. 
In this paper we follow an alternative route in trying to empirically detect social 
interactions, i.e. by treating book sales as stochastic dynamic processes driven by 
information transmission, and studying the distributional features of the statistical 
attractors to which these dynamic processes converge (DeVany and Walls, 1996). We 
start by recognizing that the occurrence of some bestsellers among a large population 
of books selling a very limited amount of copies should imply a book sales distribution 
characterized by a positive support and a very long and heavy right tail. In principle, 
the exact profile of this tail should convey information on the stochastic process 
generating it, as different models lead to different testable predictions on how large 
observations relate to the bulk of the distribution. 
In order to assess the legitimacy of our working hypothesis, the first step consists in 
performing a preliminary analysis based on a representational technique traditionally 
employed in hard sciences like physics, the so-called Zipf plot, consisting in plotting the 
log of the rank versus the log of the variable being analyzed (Stanley et al., 1995). 
Briefly, suppose that we observe M realizations (s1, …, sM) of a non-negative random 
variable S, whose cumulative distribution function is F(s).  If we rank the data from the 
largest to the smallest, with the index i being the rank of si, we obtain: 
 
       ( )[ ] MsFi i ln1lnln +−= .   (1) 
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The rank-size relation is extremely useful as it accentuates the tails of the 
distribution. In particular, while the typical shape of many well-known fat-tail 
distributions, like the lognormal or the Weibull ones, is typically downward bending if 
plotted in a log-log plot, the appearance of a linear rank-size relationship in double-
logarithmic paper can be immediately read as the sign of a power law distribution. The 
power law distribution corresponds to the asymptotic limit of the Pareto distribution: 
 
         [ ]
α−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=≥
0
Pr
s
ssS          (2) 
 
where s0 is lower threshold (S ≥ s0) and α > 0. Provided that [1 – F(s)] ∼ s−α, where f(x) ∼ 
g(x) represents that the limit of their ratio goes to 1 as x grows large, the double 
logarithmic plot of sales versus rank appears as a straight line with slope −α. It follows 
that in a power law distribution the tails fall to the power α, which leads to much 
heavier tails than other models  commonly used in describing how demand distributes 
in monopolistically competitive markets, such as Gaussian or exponential 
distributions. Roughly speaking, if the data on book sales are power law distributed, 
the average value of total revenues and profits are dominated by few bestsellers. 
Furthermore, as discussed below, Paretian behaviors are generally due to stochastic 
processes in which all possible outcomes are equally likely ex-ante, i.e. the statistical 
translation of the nobody knows principle. As a result, the book publishing business is an 
extremely risky one, much riskier than predicted by the now conventional wisdom 
among the profession.  
Figure 1 reports a representative sample of Zipf plots of book sales distributions in 
Italy, randomly selected from a data-set reporting bi-monthly sales in bookstores 
during the period 1994-96. Each point represents (the log of) a rank-size pair, where 
size refers to the total number of copies sold by a title during a time window elapsing 
two months. More details on the data will be provided in Section 4. Notice that in all 
cases of Figure 1 a linear relationship appears. More importantly, as we will show with 
more details in Section 4 the same feature emerges regularly in our data-set, suggesting 
that a power law behavior in the demand for books in Italy seems to be pervasive. As 
shown in Section 4, all estimates yields α < 2 with a remarkable goodness of fit to a 
linear relationship.  
 
 
 9
Foreign novel, March-April 1995
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
  
Foreign novel, Jan.-Feb. 1995
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
 
Essays, Nov.-Dec. 1995
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
  
Italian novel, Jan.-Feb. 1996
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
 
Figure 1. Representative sample of the book sales distribution in Italy. 
 
The relevance of the Pareto distribution (2) can be immediately acknowledged by 
noting that a Paretian tail behavior with α < 2 is a distinguishing attribute of a family 
of distributions known as Lévy-stable (Lévy, 1925). In particular, the Generalized 
Central Limit Theorem (Gnedenko and Kolmogorov, 1954) states that the only possible 
limiting distribution for sums of independent and identically distributed random 
variables is a Lévy-stable distribution. The Gaussian distribution is just a special case of 
the above, obtained by imposing that each of the constituent random variables has 
finite variance.  
 
3.2 Theory 
Our theoretical benchmark is given by a simple extension of the information contagion 
model by Arthur and Lane (1993). A large (possibly infinite) number of agents i = 1, 2, 
…, are arranged on a line, the order of which is exogenously fixed and known to all. 
Agents enter sequentially into the books market, where they can choose one among a 
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continuously increasing number of alternative titles m = 1, 2, …, according to their 
internal representations − expressed in terms of probability distributions − of the 
characteristics or quality of books.  
The true intrinsic cultural merit of a book, qm, can be fully assessed only after the 
book itself has been read (experience good). However, purchasers can exploit all the 
available prior information to form beliefs on its worthiness. In particular, the quality 
of the generic book m may be gauged by means of public information on its 
performance characteristics, which takes the form of a normal prior probability 
distribution Nm ∼ N(μm, σm2). One can think of public information as advertising by the 
publisher as the book enters the market, or publicly available reviews published on 
newspapers or magazines. Furthermore, an agent can collect information by randomly 
sampling n ≤ Z among the people who proceeded him in the row, asking them about 
the quality of the book they read. The signal i obtains from each of the nm people who 
bought the book m, with ∑
=
=
M
m
m nn
1
 and M the total number of books already issued as 
the agent i enters the market, is: 
 
Xm = qm + ε     (4) 
 
where ε is a random observational error, with ε ∼ N(0, σob2). 
As the ith consumer enters the market, he has a probability p to choose a brand new 
title (M+1), on which no personal experience can be collected, while with probability (1 
– p) he can switch to one old titles m ∈ (1, M). In this last case, the agent i processes all 
the information he has collected to obtain a posterior distribution of qualities. Such a 
processing is performed by taking the convolution of the Gaussian integrals 
corresponding to the prior and to the information collected by other purchasers. The 
average expected posterior utility is then: 
 
          [ ]mmmm
mm
mpost nnn
αμαμ ++=
*
,
1
.   (5) 
 
Thus, the posterior mean signal represents an average of different polled opinions, 
with a weighting factor that is inversely proportional to the variance of the 
distributions: 
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If the new book is effectively chosen and the consumer has experienced its quality, the 
following period it is treated as an old book.  
Each consumer is endowed with a constant absolute risk aversion utility function 
defined on the internal representations associated to the quality of the  M issued books: 
 
           ( ) ( )
⎩⎨
⎧
=
>−−=
0   if                     
0   if   2exp
m λμ
λλμμ mmu    (7) 
 
so that the objective function of the ith agent is to maximize a linear function of the 
mean and the variance of the posterior probability associated to the quality of the book 
m:1 
 
          ( )2*1 obmmmm
mm
m nnn
u λσαμα −++=    (8) 
 
where the constant λ measures the degree of risk aversion: the larger λ is, the more risk 
averse the agent is. Upon computing um for each book in (1, M), consumers choose the 
book with the highest expected utility.  
The long-run dynamical properties of the choice-theoretic model (8) can be 
characterized in terms of Markovian processes. Let us assume that the sampling 
procedure is one with replacement, and define  
 
 
⎩⎨
⎧=
otherwise   0
 is purchase   theif   1 mj
T
th
m
j    for j = 1, 2, … 
 
and  
 
                                                          
1 See for example Sargent (1987, pp.154-155). 
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Thus, making use of Lemma 4.1 in Arthur and Lane (1993), we introduce the 
conditional probability: 
 
         [ ] ( )⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛==+ nnsfTTTP mmnmmn ,....,1 11    (9) 
 
where f is a polynomial of degree at most Z, whose coefficients depend on n, λ and μm, 
μ*m and σm for m = 1, …, M. In other terms, the probability of a new purchase of the 
book m depends only on its current proportion. This implies that the process for a 
consumer who has switched to buying old books with probability (1 - p) possesses an 
associated urn function (Arthur et al., 1987) 
 
           ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ === + mmmnm xn
nsTPxf 11    (10) 
 
and that the whole choice sequence with a fixed positive probability p to choose a 
brand new book each time a consumer enters the row is equivalent to an infinite Polya 
process, that is one in which the number of bins can grow without any bound.  
The urn function turns out to be a complicated polynomial, whose coefficients 
depend on the parameters of the model and the sampling mechanism. Unfortunately, 
analytical solutions can be obtained explicitly for special combinations of parameters 
only. Nevertheless, Chung et al. (2003) prove that the limiting occupancy-rate 
distribution for an infinite Polya urn belongs to just one among three broadly defined 
classes. In particular, as we let the probability a new ball is placed in an existing urn (in 
our case, a new customer purchases an incumbent book) to be proportional to γms , with 
the parameter γ ∈ R, Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and 4.2 in Chung et al. (2003) state that: 
i) if γ > 1, one bin dominates; 
ii)  if γ = 1, the limit probability distribution function associated to the random 
vector (s1, …, sM) satisfies: 
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that is a power law distribution with 
p−= 1
1α , and c is a constant; 
iii) if  −∞ < γ  < 1, the distribution of bin sizes decreases exponentially under rather 
mild conditions. 
The three conditions correspond to different models of information transmission 
among peers. While the degenerate sales distribution of point i) emerges from a 
preferential attachment scheme with positive feedback, the presence of power law or 
exponential tails can be immediately interpreted in terms of linear interaction between 
buyers or of negative feedback due to congestion effects, respectively. The shape of the 
invariant market-share distribution, in particular along its tails, returns information 
useful to make inference on the underlying interaction mechanism. 
This model helps to put on firmer choice-theoretic foundations the notion of returns 
to information, which has recently gained momentum in the empirical analysis of 
cultural markets (Walls, 1997; Maddison, 2005; Giles, 2007). In this literature, increasing 
returns to information – i.e., evidence of concavity in Zipf’s plots due to 
autocorrelation in growth rates - are generally interpreted as a signature of 
informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992), that is situations where it is optimal 
for agents choosing sequentially to ignore their own preferences and imitate the actions 
of the agents ahead of them. Our model suggests that when we replace the assumption 
of agents imitating the actions of others with that of agents exchanging information on 
the quality of the items, increasing returns to information should have far more drastic 
consequences than the mere appearance of concavity in Zipf’s plots: they should lead 
instead to a degenerate asymptotic distribution, that is one superstar whose market 
share approaches 1. De Vany and Lee (2001) use agent-based simulations to reach 
exactly the same result. It turns out that the mechanism through which private 
information is transmitted from peer to peer – that is, weather it is passed through the 
observation of the action of others or through word-of-mouth – is crucial in making 
indirect inference on the degree of returns to information.     
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4. Data description and estimation results 
The empirical analysis contained in this paper is based on proprietary data (Source: 
Demoskopea) on books’ sales, organized as bi-monthly samples of unitary prices and 
number of volumes sold in Italy between January 1994 through December 1996. For 
each year we dispose of five bi-monthly samples only, given that during the traditional 
summer holiday period (July-August) data are not collected.2 As a result, we can 
examine 15 book sales distributions (sub-samples) separately, as well as track their 
evolution in time. The dataset includes only books which succeeded in selling more 
than 600 copies in each two-month window. This means that only the upper tail of the 
whole book sales distribution is considered (s0 = 600), and that the total number of 
titles in the tails is allowed to change period by period. Finally, individual observations 
refer exclusively to sales by traditional retailers. This is not likely to seriously affect the 
generality of our results, as non-traditional distributive channels (e.g., virtual 
bookshops or book clubs) were not very important during the sampled period. 
Incidentally, this continue to remain true for Italy even in more recent years, as Internet 
and book clubs sales are estimated to represent 1-1.5 and 4 percent of the whole 
market, respectively (Canoy et al., 2006).  
From an industrial organization perspective, the relevant market for differentiated 
goods is the one composed of products that are close demand or supply substitutes. In 
the case of books, close substitutability occur among titles sharing the same artistic 
canons. In order to preserve a sufficient number of observations, we choose the 
broadest possible definition of monopolistically competitive markets for books, 
classifying data into three very general genres: Italian novels, foreign novels and (non-
novel) essays. Foreign titles are systematically translated in Italian, as in Italy the 
demand for foreign books in original language is so negligible to be considered null. 
As the most successful books and long-sellers are sometimes published in different 
editions (hardcover and paperback) and issued by several publishers (under multiple-
license contracts), we pool multiple entries of the same title.  
The final dataset includes a total of 4510 books written by 2294 authors. In 
particular, 1116 authors have written 1685 essays (with a minimum of 1 to a maximum 
of 28 books per author), 354 Italian novelists have written 764 novels (with a 
                                                          
2 As pointed out by a referee, the lack of data for a period in which the demand is likely to be 
particularly high due to more spare time available by customers could bias our analysis, 
especially as regards the apparent seasonality of the scaling exponent α. This argument clearly 
reinforce the need to take our conclusions cautiously.  
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production ranging from 1 to 27 books per author) and 824 foreign novelists have 
produced 2061 books (with a production of 1 to 46 books per authors). The sample 
contains one the most successful Italian novel of the last thirty years, Va dove ti Porta il 
Cuore by Susanna Tamaro. Stephen King is the foreign novelist with the highest 
number of books translated, Isabel Allende is the most sold writer, while Ken Follett is 
the foreign author with the highest revenues. Unsurprisingly, an analysis of books by 
authors shows that the most successful authors are also the most prolific ones.  
We estimate the power law characteristic parameter α in the linear regression 
model: 
 
     Log(i) = β − α Log(si) + u    (12) 
 
by recurring to three alternative methods: 1) Robust (White heteroskedasticity 
adjusted) Ordinary Least Squares; 2) Hamilton robust regression (Hamilton 1991); 3) 
Quantile (median) regression.3 Table 1 reports the estimated values of the coefficient α 
for the upper tail of the book sales distribution in terms of number of copies sold for 
the three segments of the market, for each period considered. All the three different 
methods seem to provide results that incorporate the same information.  
Point estimates suggest that the values of α are always significantly different from 2 
and, therefore, the estimated degree of uncertainty in the book publishing market is too 
high to be compatible with a Gaussian distribution. Recall that the lower is the 
estimated α, the heavier is the right tail of the empirical distribution, with the mean 
acting less and less as an attractor of the expected value. Revenues, and therefore 
profits, are largely dependent from few extreme events which can be hardly 
anticipated. Even if all segments are characterized by infinite variance, the degree of 
uncertainty can be nevertheless by ranked in terms of the relative value registered by 
the characteristic exponent α. Form this viewpoint, the segment of novels (in 
particular, Italian novels) turns out to be riskier than essays. Such a result holds true 
independently of the method used in estimations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Other possible methods are the Huber regression that refers to a bounded influence regression where 
observations are reweighed using criteria suggested by Huber (1964) and Mosteller and Tukey (1977); and 
the Trimmed least squares, which corresponds to a least squares method applied to the central deciles of 
the data. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the scaling exponent α for all three markets. a: White’s robust OLS 
estimates; b: robust regression estimates (Hamilton); c: median regression estimates. All 
parameters statistically significant at the 5% level. The goodness of fit R2 is higher than 0.94 in 
each case.  
 
Sample Italian novels Foreign novels Essays 
 a b c a b c a c c 
94.1 1,39  1,12 1,31 1,38 1,34 1,36 1,32 1,25 1,27 
94.2 1,33    1,14 1,18 1,34 1,23 1,27 1,33     1,32 1,33 
94.3 1,21    1,05 1,09 1,51 1,46 1,46 1,37     1,29 1,32 
94.5 1,04 1,15 1,12 1,33 1,42 1,41 1,13 1,26 1,23 
94.6 0,95    0,99 0,98 1,11 1,09 1,09 1,01 1,07 1,09 
95.1 1,07    1,06 1,06 1,2 1,2 1,21     1,35     1,31 1,34 
95.2 1,17    1,18 1,16 1,19     1,16 1,18 1,29 1,26 1,27 
95.3 1,18     1,05 1,12 1,28 1,25 1,26 1,39 1,1 1,16 
95.5 1,06    1,03 1,06 1,07 1,07 1,06 1,16     1,14 1,16 
95.6 1,01 0,93 0,95 0,91 1,02 1,04 1,11 1,06 1,08 
96.1 1,13 1,13 1,12 1,12 1,03 1,06 1,4 1,26 1,31 
96.2 1,2 1,19 1,18     1,15 1,03 1,05 1,44 1,28 1,33 
96.3 1,26 1,14 1,18 1,19 1,14 1,17 1,45 1,53 1,5 
96.5 1,15 1,12 1,12 1,2 1,09 1,11 1,3 1,25 1,26 
96.6 0,98 0,89 0,91 1,1 1 1,07 1,09 0,97 1,01 
 
 
It seems worthwhile to note that the estimated αs show a remarkable variation over 
time, which seems to follow a seasonal pattern: during the Christmas time, sales 
increase and seem to concentrate upon few titles on every market segment, making the 
business – if possible - even more risky. These seasonal effects is so strong to threat the 
existence of a mean value (see e.g. the Italian novel Nov.-Dec. samples for years 1994, 
1995 and 1996). 
As we aggregate sales according to the number of copies totally sold by each author 
(i.e., by pooling all his/her titles present in the list of most-sold books during a certain 
period), several considerations lead us to predict a higher market concentration (i.e., a 
lower α). First, bestseller writers are also the most prolific ones, so that their books 
have a higher probability to be in the market at any point in time, ceteris paribus. 
Second, only titles which have proven to be a hit abroad are translated in Italian. Third, 
as a newly issued title by a star-writer reaches a top position in the ranking for sales, 
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sales of previous books by that same author tend to increase as well due to bandwagon 
and reputation effects. Combining the three phenomena, we expect the author effect to 
be particularly strong for the novel sub-market and relatively weaker for essays, as the 
specialization of the subjects dealt with in essays makes superstar effects less likely. 
The empirical evidence reported in Figure 2, where we compare the estimated αs for 
writers and books, seems to somehow support our a-priori expectations. It appears that 
the time series of the estimated αs for authors is systematically lower than that for 
books, meaning that the author effect is present in all sub-markets. Furthermore the 
scaling exponents calculated for novelists are in general lower than that for essay-
writers. The uncertainty in the life cycle of writers (particularly novelists) is greater 
than the uncertainty surrounding the life-cycle of their books; focusing a catalogue on 
novelists, in turn, is more risky than publishing essay-writers.  
This effect is confirmed when we compare scaling parameter estimates for books 
and authors as regards revenues, as reported in Table 2. Furthermore, Table 2 reports 
also estimates of the scaling parameters calculated on the top 10% of samples, given 
that theoretical arguments suggest that only for very large observations the true tail 
behaviour is detected, due to traditional estimates based on least squares regressions 
being sample-size sensitive (Borak et al., 2005). Results for the whole distribution are 
always smaller in absolute value than that on the upper 10% tail, suggesting that 
predictions on the entire distribution (or larger tails) are systematically biased. 
However, even if sales on the far-right tails (i.e., bestsellers only) seems to be less 
concentrated, the theoretical variance is still infinite and the book market, characterized 
by wild fluctuations, proves to be extremely risky. 
Similar results hold also for other creative industries. De Vany and Walls (2004), for 
example, report estimates of α in the range 1.3 to 1.7 for motion picture box office 
revenues in the U.S. and many other countries, but the value of scaling parameter 
shrinks to 0.4 when revenues of actors in their artistic lifetime are considered. By the 
same token, Rock&Roll performers are characterized by a more hazardously line of 
business (artists’ concert revenues in the U.S. are power law distributed with α = 0.45) 
than their promoters (α = 0.55), who play the same role of publishers in the book 
industry (Connolly and Krueger, 2006). From this viewpoint, the good news emerging 
from our paper is that the career of a typical writer seems to be surrounded by lower 
risk than rock stars or actors, although uncertainty regarding success is still so high to 
be practically impossible to safely guess about it.  
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Figure 2. Estimates of α for writers (dashed line) and books (solid lines). 
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Table 2.  Full sample and top 10% estimates of total sales, revenues, and sales by authors. a: 
White’s robust OLS estimates; b: robust regression estimates (Hamilton); c: median regression 
estimates.  
Italian novels, 
Quantity, Titles 
 Foreign novels, 
Quantity, Titles 
 Essays, 
Quantity, Titles 
 a b c   a b c   a b c 
Total 0,75 0,61 0,64  Total 0,82 0,73 0,73  Total 0,96 0,73 0,84 
10% 1,39 1,42 1,21  10% 1,32 1,17 1,08  10% 1,4 1,25 1,21 
              
Italian novels, 
Revenues, Titles 
 Foreign novels, 
Revenues, Titles 
 Essays, 
Revenues, Titles 
 a b c   a b c   a b c 
Total 0,62 0,54 0,59  Total 0,6 0,62 0,59  Total 0,68 0,67 0,67 
10% 1,24 1,27 1,15  10% 1,25 1,14 0,95  10% 1,4 1,33 1,27 
              
Italian novels, 
Quantity, Authors 
 Foreign novels, 
Quantity, Authors 
 Essays, 
Quantity, Authors 
 a b c   a b c   a b c 
Total 0,65 0,53 0,55  Total 0,67 0,55 0,58  total 0,82 0,72 0,74 
10% 1,09 0,97 0,82  10% 1,05 0,86 0,83  10% 1,36 1,36 1,26 
              
Italian novels, 
Revenues, Authors 
 Foreign novels, 
Revenues, Authors 
 Essays, 
Revenues, Authors 
 a b c   a b c   a b c 
Total 0,59 0,52 0,54  Total 0,58 0,5 0,52  Total 1,37 1,44 1,41 
10% 1,07 0,94 0,9  10% 0,99 0,79 0,78  10% 0,71 0,69 0,81 
              
 
 
As a final empirical exercise, in Table 3 we compare the average of the αs for 
quantities estimated through all bimesters, to the one obtained by pooling all data for 
each submarket over the whole period 1994-1996. It turns out that the pooled estimate 
is smaller than the average of bi-monthly observations, a result due to the correlation 
among successes and failures - captured by the pooled estimate, but not by the average 
over bi-monthly estimates - driven by the dynamics demand selection process. This is 
precisely what one should expect when facing a Lévy-stable industry. Conditional on 
having sell a certain number of copies in the past, the expected sales of a book 
continues to increase with current sales, and this continues as more copies are sell. In 
 20
other terms, a success or a failure can protract over time, making a success more 
successful and a failure more flopping. 
 
Table 3. Average estimates vs. pooled estimates 
Italian novels 
 OLS Rreg MedR 
α  0,77 0,56 0,65 
Average α  1,142 1,078 1,1027 
Foreign novels 
 OLS Rreg MedR 
α 0,85 0,73 0,76 
Average α  1,2053 1,1687 1,1867 
Essays 
 OLS Rreg MedR 
α  0,97 0,75 0,85 
Average α  1,276 1,2233 1,244 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The book publishing industry is a suitable place to look at for inspecting the nexus 
between the way private information is transmitted from peer to peer and final market 
outcomes. The demand for a published piece of literature develops sequentially as 
readers discover whether they like it or not, and communicate their experience to other 
potential readers. The dynamic disclosure of preferences can generate both hits and 
flops through information bandwagon, although nobody knows ex-ante what makes a 
hit or a flop, or when it will happen. In spite of the extreme uncertainty surrounding 
the fate of a single title, some regularities at the market level can be usefully detected 
and exploited, however. In this paper we offer a simple model of information 
transmission and Bayesian updating which shows how alternative invariant (i.e., 
steady-state) market share distributions can be derived from assumptions on the 
degree of returns to information in markets characterized by word-of-mouth. In 
particular, if agents are allowed to communicate directly about the quality of an item, 
increasing returns to information (γ > 1) implies a long-run degenerate demand 
distribution, with one superstar approaching a market share of 1. If the flow of 
information on the quality of the book exhibits constant returns (γ = 1), in turn, 
demand distributes itself among items according to a Pareto distribution. Finally, an 
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exponential distribution emerges in the long-run when the transmission of information 
is bounded by decreasing returns (γ < 1).  
These results are applied to a dataset reporting sales in a representative sample of 
Italian bookshops from 1994 to 1996. We invariably find that the demand distribution 
is Pareto, with a characteristic exponent ranging between 0.9 to 1.5. Since we do not 
find any significant departure from the Pareto law towards a degenerate distribution 
or an exponential distribution, we conclude that the information transmission in the 
Italian market for books is likely to be characterized by constant returns. The dynamics 
of the book demand distribution supports the nobody knows, the winner takes all and the 
success breeds success principles, all of them features that the publishing industry shares 
with other creative industries (DeVany and Walls, 1996, 1999, 2004). Furthermore, the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the market for books follows a seasonal patterns, 
with Christmas being the most risky period of the year. 
Two possible extensions of the analysis have been conceived but left for future 
research. First, alternative estimation methodologies will be employed to check for the 
robustness of our results. Second, we will make use of data on demand to control for 
the presence of economies of scale for publishers, along the lines developed in Sornette 
(2002).  
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